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Populism and Political Engagement in Latin America
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Fernando Rosenblatt
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Abstract: Considerable research has been conducted on the relationship between socioeconomic inequality and political engagement. However, there is little consensus on the
exact nature of the relationship, and considerable variation in the relationship exists
even among countries with similar levels of inequality. This lack of clarity in the literature exists because the impact of inequality on engagement is not constant, but changes
depending on the strategic choices of political leaders. Populist leaders, who tend to
explicitly connect political and socioeconomic exclusion, can activate latent grievances
around inequality. Using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, we
show that inequality leads to disengagement among the poor in most contexts but increases engagement under populist rule. In other words, a primarily structural relationship is mediated by political variables. Even though the severity of inequality is
outside the control of any political actor, leaders’ reaction to inequality can dramatically
alter its impact on mass political behavior.

Given that structural inequality is consistently high across Latin America,
why do the poor show more political engagement in some polities than in others?
Many theories have addressed this relationship, but these studies tend to have
variables associated with economic development as their primary causal factors,
treating political variables as secondary. For example, Solt (2008) found a direct
negative effect of inequality on political engagement in wealthy democracies.
Within the democratization literature there have been several studies (e.g., Boix
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2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rueschemeyer 2004) that have modeled more
contingent relations between inequality and attitudes, but such approaches are
extremely limited in their ability to explain different outcomes among countries
with similar levels of inequality. In some sense, these limitations are built into
the design of so-called structural theories, which envision macro-level, relatively
static factors (e.g., inequality, ethnic diversity) as the most important predictors of
political phenomena. Even those works inspired by rational choice see “choice” as
the relatively automatic response of individuals to exogenous incentives and constraints; they do not envision choice as involving any real agency or contingency
at the individual level, beyond random deviation from structurally determined
behavioral patterns. Thus, in both structural and rational-choice studies, politics
is more an effect than a cause.
These works all share a missing link between inequality and political attitudes:
politics. They do not problematize the way that distributive conflict translates
into the political arena; the assumption of a constant, direct relationship between
structural conditions and mass political attitudes simply cannot account for the
array of reactions to inequality that can be observed in Latin America. In this
article, we argue that certain political “menus”—that is, leaders who make certain
types of appeals and use specific political strategies—can alter the way nationallevel inequality affects the political attitudes of the poor, in turn reshaping the
usual relationship between inequality and political engagement. More specifically, we claim that political agents can boost the political engagement of the poor
by deliberately politicizing distributive conflict.
Our goal is to fully account for the combined effect of economic structure and
political leadership agency on citizens’ attitudes and behavior toward the political arena. Structural inequality creates deep social divisions that conflict with the
democratic ideal of political equality. The poor lack the resources to transfer their
interests to politics, which generates apathy and negates the egalitarian effect of
democratic politics. Thus, inequality creates a potential for political conflict, but
that conflict remains latent in many contexts because of the inability to solve collective action dilemmas and bear the costs of political action.
Political leaders who combine a combative political strategy with strong redistributive rhetoric can trigger latent conflict. Hence, citizens’ attitudes toward
politics change from apathy to engagement. In other words, the relationship between inequality and political engagement is not really a line but a curve; the
basic structure of this curve is set by structural relations at the national level, but
its specific shape in any given society can vary a great deal depending on how
political leaders choose to react to it.
INEQUALITY AND ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICS:
COLLECTIVE ACTION COSTS AS THE MISSING LINK

Before proceeding with the theoretical framework, we need to specify what
we mean by inequality. Inequality is a multilevel concept, composed of severity of
inequality at the national level and socioeconomic status (SES) at the individual
level. Inequality is endemic in Latin America, and thus there is little variation
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at the national level, with a few notable exceptions, such as Uruguay. Hence, we
mostly analyze its effect at the individual level, although we do include nationallevel inequality as a control variable in our statistical analyses.
The effect of inequality on politics has increasingly gained scholarly attention.
Solt (2008) conducted an empirical analysis specifically on the effect of inequality
on political attitudes, in which he efficiently organized existing theoretical approaches to the topic into three distinct groups. First, he identifies the theory of
relative power. This approach assumes that there is a linear relationship between
economic power and political power. Possession of resources translates into marginalization of those who have fewer resources. Consequently, it is assumed that
the poor will be alienated and will show greater apathy toward politics because
their interests are not politicized (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). This also generates
low involvement of the rich, since they do not feel their interests are threatened
(Solt 2008). In short, high national inequality will have a negative impact on engagement, whereas socioeconomic status will have no impact, with the wealthy
and poor equally disengaged in high-inequality societies.
The second approach introduced by Solt (2008) emphasizes conflict. As opposed to the previous perspective, greater distributive conflict leads to greater interest in politics (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Brady 2004). In Solt’s (2008, 49) words:
“Higher levels of inequality cause divergences in political preferences that fuel
debates about the appropriate course of policy; these debates then cause higher
rates of political mobilization.” He also claims that polarization between the rich
and the poor increases with inequality. In this perspective we could include Boix
(2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) works, as their models assume that
the distributive conflict automatically translates into the political realm. This approach predicts increased engagement in high-inequality societies but also that
SES will have no impact within countries; the intense conflict engendered by inequality should equally galvanize the rich and poor.
A third approach is resource theory. This theory holds that political participation has a cost, and involvement is a function of individuals’ resources, that is,
their capacity to pay the cost of participating depends on relative income (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). Consequently, those who have enough
resources (the rich) to pay that cost will have greater involvement than those who
do not (the poor) (Solt 2008, 49–50). This approach shares with relative power theory the prediction of a negative relationship between national-level inequality
and political engagement, but it further predicts that socioeconomic status will
have a positive relationship with engagement. That is, high inequality will generally depress engagement, but this depression will be especially acute among poor
citizens and much less severe among the wealthy.
Solt (2008) tests these three different approaches in upper-middle-income democracies. He concludes that results are consistent only with the relative power
theory. In a nutshell, lower income quintiles have less political involvement; when
inequality is extremely high, the poor are so marginalized that the wealthy cease
to participate as well, secure in their social position. In Solt’s (2008, 58) own words:
“Declining political interest, discussion of politics, and participation in elections
among poorer citizens with rising inequality attest to the increased ability of rela-

P7019.indb 5

11/14/16 10:33 AM

6 Latin American Research Review
tively wealthy individuals to make politics meaningless for those with lower incomes in such circumstances.”
What is the problem with these approaches? They do not allow political leaders to try different tactics or strategies when faced with the same circumstances.
All of these approaches assume a consistent linear relationship between inequality and political engagement. They all assume that the poor must bear the entire cost of participation. This assumption rules out the possibility that political
agents or leaders may have much to gain by paying costs or offering solutions to
collective action problems. When the effect of different political strategies is taken
into account, the relationship between inequality (in both its dimensions) and
engagement becomes highly dependent on political context. Inequality and one’s
position in the income distribution matter, but their impact is shaped by the kind
of political options available. More specifically, in the context of contemporary
Latin America, that impact is mediated by the existence of leaders who activate
the distributive conflict.
We are not the first to argue that political variables create varying outcomes
in response to constant structural conditions. For example, Roberts (2002) examined how such dynamics affect parties and party systems. Several scholars have
explained variation in policy outcomes despite similar levels of inequality by
introducing political variables. Some have related the political determinants of
inequality to redistribution regimes (Huber et al. 2006; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009; Huber and Stephens 2010; Pribble
2011). It is generally agreed that the poor have significantly more severe collective
action problems than do those in higher social strata (Houle 2009). The poor’s
only advantage lies in their number, which is really no advantage at all because
coordination has been historically elusive. This is why those who study democratization have paid significant attention to collective action problems of the poor
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992).
These arguments share a common feature. For political outcomes where the
behavior of the poor is potentially decisive, the crucial variable is whether and
how the poor’s collective action dilemma is solved. However, none of these works
explicitly includes theories of how these dilemmas get solved, and how different
types of solutions may lead to different outcomes within similar structural contexts. They are taken as exogenous explanatory variables rather than dependent
variables needing explanation of their own.
Under democracy political leaders are necessary, even essential, for precisely
this reason: acting in pursuit of their own interests, they provide solutions to
collective action dilemmas for those who cannot provide for themselves. However, there is no guarantee in any given context that leaders will appear to take
advantage of latent redistributive conflict. As the vast literature on party-citizen
linkages suggests, representation of the poor’s redistributive interests cannot be
taken for granted (Kitschelt 2000; Piattoni 2001; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kitschelt et al. 2010; Luna 2014). The highly contingent nature of this
interaction between economic structure and political strategy can produce a wide
range of outcomes even in similar contexts.
Before discussing the types of strategies that might be best suited for solving
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the collective action dilemmas we have described, we need to briefly clarify our
argument. Our argument is not centered on policy outcomes; we have nothing
to say about why countries choose different tactics for dealing with inequality,
or about why some are more successful than others in this regard. Instead of explaining different levels of inequality or social spending, the conventional approach to structural inequality in the Latin American literature, we try to assess
how political strategy interacts with inequality to produce the variation in patterns of engagement that we observe.
TYPES OF POLITICAL STRATEGIES

Now that we have established the potential importance of political strategies
in our argument, an obvious question arises: what sort of strategy is most likely
to solve the collective action dilemmas of the poor? Given that our theory involves
political strategy, it makes sense to turn to a movement and leaders defined by
political strategy: populists. Defi ning populism is a contentious issue in political
science. However, there seems to be considerable support for several key features.
Weyland (2001) argued convincingly that, whatever the specific definition, populism is an explicitly political strategy. The definition used here conforms to that
insight: we define populism as a political strategy characterized by two features.
The first is the assumption that social problems can and should be solved through
the political arena. The second is the embrace of an extremely combative political style, in which conflict and open confrontation with one’s political adversaries is considered necessary and desirable.1 This definition is very similar to that
employed by Hawkins (2010), who emphasizes a Manichaean discourse pitting
the populist movement against all others. It is also similar to the defi nition of the
“contestatory left” as defined by Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010), although
the definition used here is not confined to the political left.
The relevance of populism to the theory here is fairly straightforward. Populists “feel the urge to contest with political enemies” in order to “strengthen the
loyalty of mass followers” (Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010, 3). Populist leaders often preside over fractious, poorly institutionalized mass movements, and
thus have strong incentives to encourage political action among their followers as
a mechanism for maintaining unity and movement cohesion. For those populists
whose ideology places them among the political left, the attraction of activating
latent disaffection over inequality in order to cement their links to their base is
clear.
There is a fundamental divide between leaders and movements that could be
placed on the left of the Latin American ideological spectrum. In their book on
leftist governments in Latin America, Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010) emphasize the division between reformist leftists and more radical leftist leaders
who, in the modern era, have been populist as opposed to socialist or communist
parties. The reformist left accepts the current rules of the game (political institu1. This definition helps clarify a difficult case: that of Uruguay. The Frente Amplio certainly meets
the first criteria but not the second.
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tions) as given and legitimate, and it seeks to work under those rules to reduce
poverty and the negative social effects of inequality through sound policy and a
nonconfrontational relationship with the elite. The populist left, however, views
inequality, both social and political, as a root cause of social ills and has a confrontational orientation to it and its social manifestations. To the reformist, everyone
can eventually win; to the populist, the poor can gain only what the rich lose; this
Manichaean view of political competition is, in fact, a defining characteristic of
populism to many (Hawkins 2010). The zero-sum nature of social competition envisioned by populist leaders naturally leads to a strong emphasis on contention.
This also explains why we choose to accept standard categorizations of the left
that lump the highly mobilized Frente Amplio in Uruguay, for example, with elitist leftist parties. In the absence of anti-elite vitriol and the emphasis on a conciliatory approach to dealing with social inequality, we have little reason to expect a
dramatic reshaping of the engagement curve (although the intercept of the curve
might well be higher in countries with a mobilized but noncontestatory left).
Left-wing populists, perhaps more than any other type of leader, stress the interconnections between political and economic marginalization and the potential
to overcome the latter by ending the former. Even though traditional leftist parties
could hypothetically fulfill the causal role we ascribe to populist leaders, nothing
ensures that such parties will actually seek to mobilize the poor. In fact, in the
context of institutionalized party systems the electoral success of such parties can
be partly explained by the moderation of their redistributive claims (Hunter 2010;
Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011).2 This argument
complements Roberts’s (2002) claim that traditional political parties in Latin America have, for a variety of reasons, failed to activate latent concerns over inequality.
In some sense our argument poses a caveat to his claim: while parties have not
taken advantage of this opportunity, personalistic leaders, particularly those who
come from outside the traditional elite, have seized the opportunity to fill the void.
Furthermore, the presence of electorally viable populist alternatives with strong
redistributive claims is likely to translate economic interests into politics.
To summarize, leaders who favor redistribution should not be expected to
produce any change in the relationship between SES and political engagement
as posited by resource theory. However, the combination of a combative political strategy and leftist ideology creates a strong incentive for left-wing populists
to offer organizational and rhetorical support to the poor, thus allowing them
to overcome collective action dilemmas and the prohibitive costs of political action. In essence, we propose a two-dimensional schema (see table 1) for political
leaders that is based on both their policy appeals (redistribution or not) and their
political strategy (emphasis on mobilization against the elite, or emphasis on ne2. Luna, Bidegain, and Reserve (2011, 1) introduce a novel account on the impact of “neo-socialist
mobilization” on citizens’ values: “Cases undergoing ‘neo-socialist’ mobilization seem to have gained at
least some programmatic structure. This took place on the midst of unfavorable historical and structural
conditions. . . . [P]olarizing political processes can lead to RPG [responsible party government] especially when bottom-up organizing and collective action match leaders’ mobilization attempts. Moreover,
RPG emerges more often as a result of leftist-driven polarization, which also has to be sustained over a
given significantly long period of time.” Their work inspires our endeavor and both are intertwined.
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Table 1 Political strategies and the effects on levels of engagement
Political strategy

Redistributive claims
No redistributive claims

Anti-elite
mobilization

No anti-elite
mobilizationa

Populists
Rightist populistsb

Moderate leftists
Center and right

a
This category includes both demobilized parties (e.g., those of the Concertación in Chile) and mobilized leftist parties that nevertheless take a largely conciliatory tone toward the wealthy and their
political representatives (e.g., Frente Amplio in Uruguay or the Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores).
b
In our time frame this cell is empty, but historically it might include figures such as Carlos Saúl
Menem (Argentina) and Alberto Fujimori (Peru) (Weyland 2002).

gotiation and compromise with the elite). We argue that both these elements are
necessary to reshape the engagement curve.
This is not a minor question: if moderate leftists have the same effect on the relationship between inequality and political engagement that populists do, it would
indicate that poverty reduction policies alone are sufficient to trigger a reduction
in the slope of the engagement curve. This allows for a test not only of the theory
proposed here but also of its causal mechanism. If redistribution alone were sufficient to moderate the relationship between SES and engagement, it would suggest that policy content was the primary mechanism. However, if moderate leftists
and populists do not have the same impact on this relationship, it would provide
strong evidence for our argument that explicitly political factors play an important
role on leveling the engagement curve between the poor and the rich.
Before we proceed to our empirical analysis, we believe it is necessary to clearly
state what we do not mean with our argument as it relates to political strategy.
Much has been written in the past few years regarding the pernicious effects of
populism on democracy. The wave of populist regimes in Latin America has generated interesting scholarly work analyzing the impact of these types of regimes
(e.g., Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010). Our argument does not necessarily contradict their findings. Neither normative nor theoretical implications of the effect
these governments have on democratic stability, democratic quality, or the relative
health of competitive politics will be derived from our analysis here, except for
brief speculation in the conclusion. We do highlight how, under some scenarios
in which inequality is rampant and unaddressed by the political system, populist
governments can positively affect citizens’ political engagement. Second, it is not
our purpose to identify the historical conditions that determine the emergence of
populist leaders who favor a strong redistributive rhetoric. As mentioned before,
populism has arisen at various periods throughout Latin America, and it does
not appear to be predicted by national-level inequality in the region. In fact, the
appearance of successful populists is more likely predicted by political context
than by economic variables (Rhodes-Purdy 2015). Therefore we feel confident that
populism’s presence or absence can be safely treated as exogenous for the purposes of our analyses. We take no position on the causal antecedents of populism;
we simply show how political strategies interact with distributive realities.
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EXPLAINING INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN UNEQUAL SOCIETIES

Model Specification and Hypotheses
The most important relationship for our theory is political engagement, regressed on SES:
(1)

YPolitical Engagementi = β 0 + β 1XSESi + ui.

Because our observations are nested within country-years, we specify a multilevel model:
(2)
(3)

YPolitical Engagementi = β 0K + β 1KXSESi + u i ;
β 0 K = γ0 0 + r0 k ,

where γ00 is the between-country-year intercept, and r0 k is a random disturbance
term for the kth country. Substituting equation 3 into equation 2 leads to the
following:
(4)

YPolitical Engagementi = γ00 + β 1XSESi + r0 k + u i .

This type of model, often called a fixed-effects model, is mathematically equivalent to adding a dummy variable for each country year to an ordinary regression
model. The addition of level 2 predictors (which we specify shortly) requires the
specification presented here.
Our theory suggests that β 1 is not constant but varies depending on the presence or absence of populist leadership. This leads to the following equation:
(5)

YPolitical Engagementi = β g 0 + βg 1XSESi + u i ,

where g is the subscript for each group (either populists and nonpopulists in the
two-group analysis, or populists, moderate leftists, and others in the three-group
analysis). Our theory suggests a set of hypotheses:
H1 0: β 1 (populist ) = β 1(nonpopulist)
H1A: β 1( populist) ≠ β 1(nonpopulist)

Specifically, we expect the SES coefficient to be significantly lower for populist
country-years than for nonpopulist country-years. There are two ways to model
such a relationship. The first is multiple group analysis, which involves splitting
the sample into populist, nonpopulist, and moderate-leftist country-years, then
separately estimating the structural parameters for each sample. The second involves specification of a random slope. This requires the addition of the following
to equation set:
(6)
(7)
(8)

YPEi = β 0k + β 1kXSES + ui ,
β 0k = γ00 + γ01X Populistk + r0k , and
β 1k = γ 10 + γ 11X Populist + r1 k .

Substituting equations 7 and 8 into equation 6 leads to the following:
(9)

YPEi = γ 00 + γ01X Populistk + γ 10XSESi + γ 11(X Populistk * XSESi ) + r0k + r1 k+ ui .

The random slope model suggests the following hypotheses to test whether the
effect of SES varies depending on the presence or absence of populist leadership:
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H20: γ 11 = 0
H2 A: γ 11 ≠ 0

Where XPopulistk is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the kth country-year has a populist leader and 0 if not. The extension of this equation for the three-group model
is excluded for brevity. In our analysis we focus on the multiple group analysis as
the most reliable. In addition to greater flexibility, the relatively small number of
country-years in our study gives the random-slope approach fairly low statistical
power; we include such analyses primarily as a robustness check.
Finally, we include a full suite of control variables. Of these, the most important is national-level inequality. Because left-wing populists may well be more
likely to come to power in high-inequality societies (as conflict theory would suggest), leaving this variable out of analyses could lead to differences in the SES
coefficient that would appear to be caused by populism but are in fact the product
of higher inequality. We also include national income and a dummy variable for
election years (either executive or parliamentary) at the country-year level. At the
individual level we include gender, age, ideological self-placement and ideological intensity, and a dummy for urban respondents.
Data
Individual-level data used in this article are from the 2006–2012 rounds of the
LAPOP surveys. Countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We also
used data from the 1998–2012 waves of LAPOP in Bolivia to provide an additional
test of our theory by showing change within a country before and after the election of a populist leader.
Measurement
Both of our most important variables, political engagement and SES, are abstract and difficult to measure directly. We use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
techniques to account for this difficulty. We assume that political engagement and
SES are latent, unobservable variables, which affect our observed indicators (with
some random error). Mathematically this can be expressed as follows:
(10) yij = logit(λ jη + εi), and
(11) xij = λ j ξ + δi ,

where yij is the i th observation of the j th indicator of the political engagement
latent variable (η), x is the j th indicator of the latent SES variable (ξ ), and εi and δi
are random measurement error terms. We use a logit link function for political
engagement because its indicators are binary. We use a series of questions related
to political behavior and attitudes as indicators of this latent concept—the clear
implication being that individuals who engage in more forms of participation are,
almost by definition, more engaged than those who participate in fewer; statistical
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analysis in other contexts supports this (Rhodes-Purdy 2012). The items we use
as indicators are attended a municipal council meeting, petitioned local officials,
attended a political meeting, attended a protest, retrospective vote, prospective
vote, and party ID. Data for party ID and prospective vote were not available in
the earlier waves of the Bolivian studies, so the Bolivia-specific analysis does not
include those as indicators for any year.
Socioeconomic status is measured by three indicators. We use income (standardized into deciles by country-year due to changes in question scale in the 2012
wave), years of education, and a count of durable goods owned as indicators of
the SES latent variable.3 The result is a continuous variable with zero mean. We
use this variable in two ways in our analyses. First, we include the continuous
measure, which assumes a linear relationship between SES and political engagement. To account for potential nonlinearity, we also divide this variable into quintiles, and include dummy variables for membership in the four lowest SES groups
(leaving the fifth as the reference category).
Simultaneous estimation of measurement and structural models, especially for
models using random slopes, is prohibitively computationally intensive. Therefore, we first estimated the parameters of the CFA model listed earlier, using Stata
version 13, and then used its postestimation predict function to get predicted factor scores for both political engagement and SES. In other words, we substitute
η̂ i and ξ̂i for YPolitical Engagementi and XSESi , respectively, in equations 1–9. Results of the
CFA are presented in table 2.
Income inequality across countries is measured by a Gini index of net income
inequality (i.e., inequality after taxes and redistribution), taken from Solt’s Standardized World Inequality Database (SWID). Solt’s data set (version 5) has data
for all country-years we use except several 2012 country-years, for which we simply use the 2011 data, and Nicaragua, where data is available only through 2009.
We use the 2009 data for both 2010 and 2012 waves in Nicaragua. Solt’s data set
includes one hundred imputations; therefore, we analyze the data through the
standard procedure for handling multiple imputation data sets in Mplus version 7. National income is measured as the log of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 2005 dollars.4
To classify our cases as populists, moderate leftists, and others, we rely on recent literature on the subject (Hawkins 2009; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010;
Lanzaro 2008; Castañeda and Morales 2008). Given the wave of leftist governments in the region, many scholars of Latin American politics have attempted to
distinguish moderate leftists from populist leftists. Although they have different
criteria, all these studies agree on the classification of each case (when their cases
coincide). Our only disagreement with the literature is that we classify Argentina
as a case with a populist president. Cristina Fernández has revived the traditions
of the Peronist movement. At the same time, she has developed policies and polit-

3. The goods are television, refrigerator, telephone (home and mobile), car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, home drinking water, bathroom in the house, computer.
4. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT, “Estadísticas e indicadores,” http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/estadisticasIndicadores.asp?idioma=e.
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Table 2 Estimation results, measurement models
Indicator

Loading estimate (SE)

p-value

1.39
(.020)
1.00
(.016)
2.03
(.031)
.936
(.017)
.623
(.013)
1.06
(.015)
1.88
(.028)

.000

Political engagement (n = 119,069)
Attended municipal meeting
Petitioned official
Attended political meeting
Attended protest
Retrospective vote
Prospective vote
Party ID

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

SES (n = 102,119)
Income decile
Education
Goods owned
Goodness-of-fit statistics a
Chi-square b
RMSEA
CFI

1.96
(.010)
2.86
(.015)
.182
(.001)

.000

Statistic
4,919.0
.054
.911

p-value
.000
.000
—

.000
.000

Goodness-of-fit statistics not available for SES because model is exactly identified.
Significant chi-square statistics usually indicate poor model fit. However, given the sensitivity of this
statistic to sample size and the large number of observations, this statistic is not a reliable indicator.
a

b

ical strategies based on strong redistributive claims. A list of country-years coded
as moderate leftist and populist is presented in table 3. All other control variables
(gender, age, urban, ideology) are measured by the relevant LAPOP questions.
Ideological intensity is measured by squaring the ideology variable.
Estimation
The estimations for the regionwide regression models were conducted in
MPLUS version 7, using maximum likelihood (ML) with missing values. This
technique constructs the likelihood function observation by observation, using
whatever information each observation contains (unless all independent variables
are missing). This assumes missing at random (MAR), which is risky, as income
and ideology are known to often be missing as a function of their values (not
missing at random, or NMAR). NMAR models are extremely sensitive to viola-
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Table 3 List of leaders by type
Leader

Leadership
type

Country

Waves in
power

Cristina Fernández
Evo Morales
Rafael Correa
Daniel Ortega
Hugo Chávez
Lula da Silva
Dilma Rousseff
Ricardo Lagos
Michelle Bachelet
Fernando Lugo
Tabaré Vázquez
José Mujica

Populist
Populist
Populist
Populist
Populist
Moderate leftist
Moderate leftist
Moderate leftist
Moderate leftist
Moderate leftist
Moderate leftist
Moderate leftist

Argentina
Bolivia
Ecuador
Nicaragua
Venezuela
Brazil
Brazil
Chile
Chile
Paraguay
Uruguay
Uruguay

2008–2012
2006–2012
2008–2012
2008–2012
All
2006–2010
2012
2006
2006–2010
2008–2012
2006–2010
2012

Note: Years refer to the LAPOP wave, not actual years in power. Néstor Kirchner is excluded from analysis because Argentina was not included in the 2006 LAPOP wave, the last in which he was in power.

tions of normality, and we feel that avoiding attempts to model these missingness
functions is the safer choice (Allison 2012, 20). For the multiple group analyses,
we use Wald tests to determine whether the coefficients for SES are significantly
different across populists and nonpopulists.
Analysis of Results
A brief restatement of the expectations of different theories is useful here.
The three theories we have presented make clear predictions about relationships
between inequality, SES, and engagement. These predictions are presented in
table 4.
Our argument can be summarized as follows: We concur with resource theory
regarding the role of access to mobilization resources in the relationship between
SES, inequality, and engagement. However, our argument suggests an important modification to resource theory: the inability of the poor to pay the costs of
participation is not constant because political leaders can step in to help bear the
burden, thus moderating the impact of SES on engagement. In other words, political leaders who successfully mobilize the poor can push their societies toward dynamics closer to conflict theory than to either resource or relative power theory.
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics in table 5. Specifically, we present
the mean predicted factor scores for the engagement latent variable for the lowest
and highest SES quintiles, by country and by populist and nonpopulist countryyears.
The difference between populist and nonpopulist country-years is considerable. The discrepancy in engagement between the poorest and the wealthiest in
populist countries is much larger in nonpopulist countries. This immediately
suggests that populism has some impact on how SES and political engagement
relate, although such a simple comparison cannot provide strong evidence. Anal-
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Table 4 Summary of theoretical predictions

SES coefficient
Inequality

Relative
power

Conflict

Resource

Null
Negative

Null
Positive

Negative
Negative

Table 5 Descriptive statistics, mean engagement levels
1st SES quintile
Mexico
Guatemala
El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Colombia
Ecuador
Bolivia
Peru
Paraguay
Chile
Uruguay
Brazil
Venezuela
Argentina
Dominican Republic
Nonpopulists
Populists

−.001
−.169
−.096
−.016
.050
−.195
−.132
−.077
−.168
.091
.011
−.044
−.252
.090
−.060
−.027
−.061
.543
−.025
.020

5th SES quintile
.025
−.094
.104
.175
.214
.003
−.028
.088
−.009
.087
−.057
.228
−.214
.288
−.005
.064
−.067
.359
.051
.028

Difference
−.026
−075
−.200
−.191
−.164
−.198
−.104
−.165
−.159
.004
.068
−.272
−.038
−.198
−.055
−.091
.006
.175
−.076
−.008

yses of the multiple group model developed earlier provides far more convincing
evidence; results are presented in tables 6 and 7.
Countries without populist leaders largely follow conventional social science
expectations about the relationship between socioeconomic status and political
engagement.5 As the results presented in tables 6 and 7 show, SES is positively
associated with political engagement; the rich participate more than the poor to
a significant degree. However, our analysis introduces a significant caveat. While
the conventional treatment of the relationship between society and politics as
unidirectional and invariant across contexts may be reasonable in developed
societies, it is questionable in a context of developing societies such as those in
Latin America. The stakes of politics are substantially higher in Latin America

5. These countries are thus fairly compatible with Solt’s (2008) relative power framework as well as
resource theory. The latter differs from relative power theory only in the extent to which the rich meet
the disengagement of the poor with disengagement of their own or continued participation. Both imply
a positive linear relationship; the former simply has a somewhat shallower slope than the latter.
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6.39
.012

−.017
.006

Populist, others
Moderate leftist, others

.012
.912

p-value

Wald
statistic

Diff.

.287
.000
.024

.974
.542
.801

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

p-value

.014
.007
.097

.133
.123
.174

.006
.004
.017
.022
.003
.005

SE

SES coefficient difference

.015
.915
.220

−.004
−.075
−.044

Country-year level
Inequality
National income
Election year

Intercept
Individual residual variance
Country-year residual variance

.071
.102
−.125
−.195
−.051
.183

Est.

Individual level
SES
Age
Female
Urban
Ideology
Ideological intensity

Political engagement (n = 94,107)

Populist (n = 26,883)

Table 6 Multigroup comparison, SES continuous

.081
.895
.015

−.146
−.176
−.023

.094
.129
−.065
−.043
−.044
.141

Est.

.578
.077
.166

.339
1.583
.565

.055
.029
.192
.066
.045
.027

SE

.000
.000
.000

.667
.912
.967

.088
.000
.734
.510
.324
.000

p-value

Moderate leftist (n = 17,535)

.069
.902
.042

.002
−.057
.253

.088
.128
−.137
−.157
.021
.105

Est.

.089
.002
.016

.050
.049
.122

.003
.003
.006
.007
.002
.002

SE

.000
.000
.000

.971
.239
.038

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

p-value

Others (n = 49,689)
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Table 7 Multigroup comparison, SES categorical by quintiles

Political engagement (n = 94,107)

Populist (n = 26,883)

Others (n = 67,224)

Est.

Est.

SE

p-value

SE

p-value

Individual level
SES, 1st quintile
SES, 2nd quintile
SES, 3rd quintile
SES, 4th quintile
Age
Female
Urban
Ideology
Ideological intensity

−.217
−.092
−.080
−.043
.103
−.126
−.194
−.051
.184

.040
.026
.032
.076
.007
.050
.082
.008
.025

.000
.000
.012
.576
.000
.013
.017
.000
.000

−.251
−.181
−.159
−.109
.127
−.120
−.128
.004
.115

.010
.010
.012
.014
.002
.006
.006
.002
.002

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.024
.000

Country-year level
Inequality
National income
Election year

−.004
−.073
−.045

.617
.492
.547

.995
.881
.935

−.062
−.089
.133

.043
.049
.091

.151
.066
.143

.301
.915
.015

.137
.015
.065

.028
.000
.814

.234
.902
.046

.066
.002
.015

.000
.000
.001

Diff.

Wald
test

p-value

.034
.089
.079
.066
.067

.697
10.2
5.41
.743
.197

.404
.001
.020
.389
.657

Intercept
Individual disturbance variance
Country-year disturbance variance
SES coefficient difference
SES, 1st quintile
SES, 2nd quintile
SES, 3rd quintile
SES, 4th quintile
Intercept

than in the industrialized world, where the acceptable policy space is relatively
well defined. Absolute inequality matters, but not as a variable. Rather, it is important because it creates a pool of alienation and resentment that can be tapped
under the some circumstances. However, while this resource remains dormant,
societies do tend to follow patterns of engagement in line with the conventional
predictions; that is, the rich tend to participate more in politics.
Such dynamics, however, can change rather quickly. The potential for redistributive conflict, and the hesitance of traditional political elites to confront it,
gives ambitious outsiders a ready resource to challenge the existing order. Highly
unequal societies that experience mobilization political strategies tend to follow
the dynamics predicted by conflict theory. The slope of the engagement curve is
significantly shallower among populist country-years than among those without
populist leaders. The results in table 7 are particularly clear. In substantive terms,
this means that the relationship between SES and political engagement is considerably weaker in countries with populist rulers. What is even more interesting is
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the slope for moderate leftists, which is actually steeper than in either populist or
non-redistributive country-years.
In table 6, the slope of SES is roughly 20 percent smaller in populist countryyears than in those without populists. In table 7, the impact of being in the secondlowest SES quintile is twice as large in nonpopulist country-years as in populist country-years. Table 6 also conforms to conflict theory because all five SES
quintiles had higher predicted levels of support in populist countries, although
differences were larger in the lower classes. Random slope models largely confirmed these analyses, although the difference for SES was not statistically significant when treated as continuous (this was likely a result of low statistical power).
These results of those analyses are presented in tables 8 and 9.
In simple terms, economic inequality predicts political inequality most directly in countries that are governed by the moderate left, then in countries governed by leaders who do not offer redistribution, or in populist countries. The
difference is just short of statistical significance (at the .05 level), but this finding
is still interesting. The implication is that, when redistribution is offered without
a mobilization political strategy, the poor actually withdraw from the political
arena (perhaps content that their interests are being represented). Conversely, the
rich, perhaps feeling threatened, increase their political activity in this scenario.
Whatever the explanation, these analyses strongly support the importance of
political strategy for moderating the relationship between economic inequality
and political attitudes.
A simple comparison of differences across country-years is highly suggestive,
but attributing the effect directly to populist leadership is difficult; some factor
that predicts both populism and a reshaping of the engagement curve could be
Table 8 Random slope multilevel model, SES continuous
Political engagement (n = 94,107)

SE

p-value

Individual level
SES
Age
Female
Urban
Ideology
Ideological intensity

.093
.122
−.122
−.161
−.013
.135

.014
.002
.004
.005
.002
.002

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

Country-year level
Populist
Populist × SES

−.063
−.027

.102
.025

.537
.279

Inequality
National income
Election year

−.061
−.110
.095

.041
.039
.068

.132
.005
.163

.161
.903
.039

.047
.001
.008

.004
.000
.000

Intercept
Individual disturbance variance
Country-year disturbance variance
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Table 9 Random slope multilevel model, SES categorical by quintiles
Political engagement (n = 94,107)

Est.

SE

p-value

Individual level
SES, 1st quintile
SES, 2nd quintile
SES, 3rd quintile
SES, 4th quintile

−.262
−.189
−.162
−.111

.035
.023
.018
.014

.000
.000
.000
.000

Age
Female
Urban
Ideology
Ideological intensity

.121
−.123
−.153
−.013
.135

.002
.005
.005
.002
.002

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

Country-year level
Populist
Populist × SES, 1st quintile
Populist × SES, 2nd quintile
Populist × SES, 3rd quintile
Populist × SES, 4th quintile

−.144
.061
.103
.085
.069

.108
.072
.053
.034
.027

.182
.396
.052
.011
.011

Inequality
National income
Election year

−.066
−.118
.091

.039
.041
.074

.093
.004
.218

.301
.904
.035

.046
.002
.010

.004
.000
.000

Intercept
Individual disturbance variance
Country-year disturbance variance

driving the results. The most likely suspect is national-level inequality, for which
we control, but there could well be others. To address this, we also conducted
an analysis of one country, Bolivia, for which data are available for several years
before and after the rise of Evo Morales. This model has identical measures to
those presented earlier except for two indicators of engagement that were not
available. Additionally, we drop country-level predictors and use a simple fixedeffects model, where the idiosyncratic effects of such predictors are controlled for
via the year-level residuals. Results from these analyses are presented in tables 10
and 11.
These results conform to those presented earlier. The coefficient of SES was
reduced by three-fifths after Morales took power. The reduction in the negative
impact of membership in the first SES quintile was a similar magnitude, while
that of second quintile membership was reduced by three-fourths (both differences were statistically significant). Short of a true experiment, this is perhaps
the closest one can get to a direct test the way populism shapes the engagement
curve. And, as in our cross-sectional analyses, the impact is clear: countries
with populist presidents adhere more to conflict theory than to either of Solt’s
alternatives.
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Table 10 Bolivia before and after Morales comparison, SES continuous
Political engagement
(n = 24,645)
Individual level
SES
Age
Female
Urban
Ideology
Ideological intensity
Intercept
Individual-level disturbance
variance
Year-level disturbance
variance

Before Morales (n = 15,452)
Est.

SE

p-value

.080
.153
−.284
−.374
−.099
.243

.009
.018
.016
.018
.013
.030

.909
.927
.063

After Morales (n = 9,193)
Est.

SE

p-value

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

.030
.138
−.176
−.013
−.140
.270

.010
.010
.021
.012
.018
.039

.004
.000
.000
.308
.000
.000

.126
.011

.000
.000

.830
.954

.111
.014

.000
.000

.037

.093

.012

.009

.176

SES coefficient difference

Diff.

Wald test

p-value

Before/after Morales

.050

13.61

.000

Table 11 Bolivia before and after Morales comparison, SES categorical by quintile
Political engagement
(n = 24,645)

Before Morales (n = 15,452)

After Morales (n = 9,193)

Est.

SE

p-value

Est.

SE

p-value

Individual level
SES, 1st quintile
SES, 2nd quintile
SES, 3rd quintile
SES, 4th quintile

−.227
−.128
−.083
−.025

.028
.026
.025
.025

.000
.000
.001
.316

−.107
−.039
−.015
−.014

.034
.032
.030
.030

.002
.217
.618
.641

Age
Female
Urban
Ideology
Ideological intensity

.156
−.284
−.372
−.220
.240

.018
.016
.018
.030
.030

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

.140
−.174
−.013
−.300
.272

.010
.021
.012
.039
.039

.000
.000
.292
.000
.000

.465
.927

.106
.011

.000
.000

.123
.954

.060
.014

.040
.000

.064

.038

.093

.012

.009

.176

Intercept
Individual-level disturbance
variance
Year-level disturbance
variance

Before/after Morales
SES coefficient difference
SES, 1st quintile
SES, 2nd quintile
SES, 3rd quintile
SES, 4th quintile
Intercept
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Diff.

Wald test

p-value

−.120
−.089
−.068
−.011
.342

7.39
4.67
3.09
.075
7.87

.007
.031
.079
.784
.005
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CONCLUSIONS

This article has shown the effects of political strategies in shaping the connection between inequality and political engagement. Latin America provides a
unique opportunity to study this relationship because it introduces an empirical
and a theoretical puzzle. Absolute inequality is relatively constant and pervasive
across countries but shows enormous variation in terms of engagement. The fact
that the key independent variable does not vary while outcomes do makes Latin
America uniquely suited for opening the black box of how structural conditions
interact with political offers to shape patterns of political activism. Moreover, by
cracking open the black box, we realize that this relationship is highly contingent
on the choices of political agents. This contingency allows us to explain the presence of greater engagement among the poor, counter to the predictions of the relative power theory of generally depressed involvement across social strata, found
by Solt (2008), given constant high inequality.
Our analysis implies the need for a more nuanced understanding of the effects
of populism in Latin America vis-à-vis democratic quality. While we do not include any explanation of when and where populists succeed in our theory, we can
speculate a bit in light of our conclusions. Concerns over populism’s disregard for
liberal norms of political competition have often obscured the contribution that
some populist movements make to bringing formerly excluded sectors of society into the political arena. Developing democracies face the following dilemma:
democracy there is either boring (i.e., the policy space is tightly constrained to
similar and moderate alternatives) and stable or intense and unstable (Rosenblatt 2013). Populism is not an accident of history but a reaction to the failure of
more “responsible” or “traditional” political actors to open the democratic arena
to all sectors of society (Rhodes-Purdy 2015). No matter how much moderate leftists may be committed to ameliorating inequality, if they fail to generate actual
significant changes, they lack the political backing to survive crises; this flaw is
of their own making, as they specifically avoid building strong mobilized bases
(with a few notable exceptions). When considered in tandem with our analyses
of the way moderate leftist leaders affect the engagement curve, this dynamic
becomes quite troubling, because such movements are inherently unsustainable.
Venezuela under Punto Fijo is a good historical example. Decades of successive
Acción Democrática administrations engaged in redistribution. However, when
crisis struck in the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional Venezuelan left was eventually felled by its elitist image, supplanted by a movement that offered the poor a
chance not merely to have a larger slice of the national treasure but also win those
gains for themselves through political participation.
In other words, populist leaders, while certainly capable of destabilizing societies with their combative style and Manichaean rhetoric, can also force societies
to confront problems that often have festered for generations. Although in the
immediate term this may mean heightened conflict and concomitant instability
(and a potential depression of democratic quality), it may also help to begin tearing down structural inequality.
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